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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
INTRODUCTION
During the past few years, the public clamor which has attended new
judicial interpretations of the rights of the accused has largely over-
shadowed a parallel trend in a related but less publicized field-the rights
of the convicted.
Spectacular decisions like Miranda,1 Escobedo,2 and Gideon v. Wain-
'wright-3 have been accompanied by such a hue and cry both within
and without the legal profession that the development of the law as it
is applied to those who have passed beyond accusation to conviction,
sentence, and imprisonment has received only moderate attention from
the legal periodicals and none at all from the lay public.
Yet while the decisions relating to the rights of the accused are basical-
ly only an articulation and clarification of principles to which our legal
system has always given recognition, the growing judicial interest in the
rights of the convicted felon can only be described as a minor revolution
in the law, for the courts are now entering an area which was formerly
regarded as the sole province of the administrative branches of the gov-
ernment. This development is of more than theoretical or scholarly
interest, because of its present and potential effects upon criminal law,
penology, and our society as a whole.
THE AMERICAN PRISON SYSTEM
In order to appreciate the impact of this extension of judicial authority,
it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the task of the Amer-
ican prison administrator.
In 1965 the estimated 2.7 million serious offenses committed in this
country resulted in an average daily prison population of 425,673 in-
mates.4 To house this convict population, there are presently some four
hundred institutions in this country maintained solely for the imprison-
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. PRESIDENT'S CO3IM1ssIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION oF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, at 45 (1967).
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ment of adult felons, and another three hundred-plus for the detention of
juvenile offenders.' The avowed purpose of these institutions is the iso-
lation of the criminal for the protection of society while the wrongdoer
"pays his debt to society" and is (theoretically) rehabilitated. These goals
have proven difficult to attain. When appropriations, personnel, or fa-
cilities -are inadequate, the historical view of the prison as a place of
isolation and punishment prevails, and the rehabilitative function is sub-
ordinated to the grim necessity of keeping the felon safely separated
from the outside world.
Consequently, the maximum security prison is traditionally a place of
high walls, guard towers, and quasi-military discipline. Inmates are con-
stantly watched, counted, and searched. There is no privacy, and the
prisoners are necessarily treated by the staff as impersonal masses, to be
numbered and marched from place to place with a minimum of frat-
ernization. The inmate's communication with relatives and friends on the
outside is heavily restricted and supervised. Punishment for minor infrac-
tions of prison regulations is swift and severe. Escape is rare and usually
short-lived.0 The result is an artificial and involuntary microsociety,
filled with stress and violence and unnatural relationships. The problems
of operating a penal institution with an inadequate and usually under-
paid staff in an outdated physical plant crowded (often to twice design
capacity) with felons, many of them convicted for crimes of the most
savage and brutal nature, can hardly be overemphasized. These internal
stresses, coupled with the external pressures of politics and public opin-
ion, make the job of the prison administrator one of the most difficult in
the world.
PAST POLICY OF THE COURTS
The historical role of the prison as a place of punishment, and the ad-
mitted complexities of the penologist's task, have resulted in a deep reluc-
tance on the part of the courts to review the decisions and actions of pris-
on administrators. This policy of non-interference with the internal af-
fairs of penal institutions has been generally referred to as the "hands-off"
doctrine.- The majority of courts adhering to this policy of non-inter-
ference with internal prison affairs have adopted the position that the
courts are "without power to supervise prison administration or to
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 46.
7. Apparently so christened in FRiTCH, CIVIL RIGHTS OF PmasoN INMATES 31 (1961)
(Document prepared for the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
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interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations." 8 This viewpoint
has been justified by reference to the principle of separation of gov-
ernmental powers, with the administration of prisons being thought to
fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the executive branch.9 The
position derives additional weight from the language of the Federal
Prisons and Prisoners Act,:' which specifically withdraws Federal prison
administration from the province of the courts and places it under the
Attorney General, and from numerous decisions declaring that the
principles of federalism prevent federal courts from exercising super-
vision over state prisons."
Other courts, while not explicitly disclaiming jurisdiction in such
cases, have reached the same result by adopting the premise that while
the judiciary still retains the power to intervene, this power should be
exercised infrequently and with the greatest discretion.
This judicial policy of non-intervention, even when grounded upon
principles of power separation and/or federalism, undoubtedly has its
roots in the history and nature of the prison system. Many courts, feel-
ing that they lack the necessary expertise to understand the realities and
necessities of prison operation, are hesitant to take any action which
might interfere with the orderly operation of powder-keg prisons, or
which might somehow compromise the ability of the prison officials to
accomplish the goals of the penal system. Furthermore, a natural
corollary of the historical development of the penal system as a means
of punishment and deterrence has been the popular view of the prisoner
as a person who has forfeited a substantial portion of his civil and human
8. Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954). See
also Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950); Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d
910 (9th Cir. 1957); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954); Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); State ex rel. Renner v. Wright,
188 Md. 189, 51 A.2d 668 (1947); Dunn v. Jones, 150 Neb. 669, 35 N.W.2d 673 (1949);
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1962);
People v. Collins, 200 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1960).
9. See, e.g, Powell v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949), wherein it was said:
The prison system is under the administration of the Attorney General...
and not of the district courts. The court has no power to interfere with the
conduct of the prison or its discipline. Id. at 331.
See also Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1955);
Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 US. 932 (1964); Day-
ton v. McGrenery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1964).
11. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957), and cases cited therein.
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rights. 2 While the severity of this viewpoint has moderated since the
early days of the prison system, it is still apparent both in public senti-
ment and judicial opinion. 3
As a result of these various factors, prison officials have been per-
mitted broad authority within the walls of their own institutions. 4 Re-
grettably, this discretion has occasionally been abused, and the prison
scandals and penitentiary riots of the past thirty years indicate that the
provisions made for administrative and judicial review and remedy of
prisoner complaints have been less than adequate.
THE PRESENT TREND
The increasing concern of the courts over the protection of individual
rights, as manifested by the new emphasis on the rights of the accused,
has also been reflected-in a new willingness of the judiciary to undertake
judicial review of the internal operations of American prisons and to
define the rights retained by the convicted felon. This trend has been
facilitated by a gradual shift of emphasis in penal philosophy. As early
as 1870, the date of the formation of the American Prison Association,
reformation, rather than punishment, was seen as the ultimate goal of
penology.' 5 The growing recognition of the convict as a human being,
capable (in some cases, at least) of being returned to society as a func-
tioning, productive citizen, has contributed to the new view of the
prisoner as a man whose rights have been temporarily restricted but by
no means abolished.' As early as 1944, a Federal court declared that
12. "(The prisoner) has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty,
but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him.
He is for the time being the slave of the State." Ruffn v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
13. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
14. "Enormous discretion is left to correctional administrators to define the conditions
of imprisonment. They determine the way in which the offender will live for the
term of imprisonment; how he is fed and clothed; whether he sleeps in a cell or a
dormitory; whether he spends his days locked up or in relative freedom; what op-
portunity he has for work, education, or recreation. They regulate his access to the
outside world by defining mailing and visiting privileges. They define rules of conduct
and the penalties for violation of such rules . . .Traditionally, few external controls
have been imposed on correctional decisions in this area." TASK FoacE REPoRT: CoR-
RECioNs, supra note 4, at 84.
15. For the development of this movement, and its effects, see H. BARNES AND N.
TEE=RS, NEw HoRuzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY (3d ed. 1959).
16. "A first tenet of our governmental, religious, and ethical tradition is the intrinsic
worth of every individual no matter how degenerate. It is a radical departure from
that tradition to accept for a defined class of persons, even criminals, a regime in
1967]
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"a prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." "7 At
that time, the principle expressed was contrary to the weight of the case
law. Today, however, it has become obvious that more and more courts,
even while occasionally paying lip-service to the hands-off doctrine, are
adopting the view that the convict remains entitled to the basic consti-
tional guarantees, and that delegation of prison authority to the ad-
ministrative branch does not preclude judicial review of the manner in
which that authority is exercised.' 8 The courts today are becoming in-
creasingly insistent that prison administrators be able to justify repressive
measures employed in prison operation, and where administrative re-
view is inadequate or ineffective, many courts will now readily assume
jurisdiction over prisoner complaints. 9
AREAS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
This judicial interest has not been confined to any specific aspect of
prison operation. The courts now appear ready to enter any and every
phase of prison administration in order to safeguard the rights of the
individual convict, and the diversity of issues already adjudicated re-
veals this new omnipresence.
Tort Claims. Tort actions by prisoners against individual guards and
officials have been permitted for some time. ° But prior to 1962, the
great majority of courts had held that the Federal Tort Claims Act2" and
its waiver of sovereign immunity were not intended by Congress to ex-
tend to prisoners.22 Further, the exception of discretionary (versus
which their right to liberty is determined by officials wholly unaccountable in the
exercise of their power and through processes which deprive them of an opportunity
to be heard on the matters of fact and policy which are relevant to thd decisions made."
Kadish, "Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HAmv.
L. REv. 904, 923 (1962), quoted in TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 4 at 83.
17. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
18. ". . . a mere grant of authority cannot be taken as a blanket waiver of responsi-
bility in its execution. Numerous federal agencies are vested with extensive administra-
tive responsibilities. But it does not follow that their actions are immune from judicial
review." Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1962), affd, 374 U.S. 150
(1963).
19. TAsK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, supra note 4, at 84.
20. See, e.g., Hill v. Gentry, 280 F.2d 88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875
(1960). However, other civil suits (i.e., against persons "on the outside") have been
prohibited. See, e.g., Tabor v. Hardwick, supra note 9.
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(d); 2671-80 (1964).
22. Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957); James v. United States, 280
F.2d 428 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 845 (1960).
[Vol. 9:178
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ministerial) acts from the effects of the Tort Claims Act provided an
additional barrier to the successful prosecution of such suits by convict
plaintiffs. In 1962-1963, two landmark cases removed this restriction.'
Since then, more than 80 suits have been filed under the Tort Claims
Act by inmates of Federal prisons, for injuries suffered while in cus-
tody.24
Medical Treatment. Traditionally, courts have declined to hear con-
vict complaints of inadequate or incompetent medical care in prison.Y
A number of recent decisions, however, have declared that such com-
plaints do state a cause of action, and are consequently reviewable by
the courts.26
Correspondence. A particularly sensitive area has been the debate over
the right of prison staffs to restrict and censor prisoner mail. Such re-
strictions have traditionally been regarded as necessary to prevent trans-
mittal of contraband, formulation of escape plots, and other illegal ac-
tivity. These regulations have generally been upheld as non-reviewable
administrative provisionsY.2 Recent decisions, while not abrogating such
restrictions entirely, have made it clear that such rules must not be
arbitrary,28 and must not interfere with prisoner communication with
the courts,- or with attorneys.30 Prohibitions on unrestricted correspon-
dence with friends, or in furtherance of the prisoner's business enter-
prises, or other communications not related to the prisoner's legal efforts,
have been upheld.3
Legal Adice and Materials. Closely related to the problem of general
correspondence is the frequent demand by prisoners for access to the
courts, legal advice, and legal texts and materials. As already noted, the
23. Muniz v. United States, supra note 18; Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d
Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
24. In one such case, underworld figure Mickey Cohen, suing for an injury inflicted
by another inmate, received a judgment against the United States for $110,000. Cohen v.
United States, 252 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966).
25. See, e.g., Haynes v. Harris, 344 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1965).
26. See, e.g., Redding v. Pate, 220 F.Supp. 124 (N.D. IMI. 1963); Hirons v. Director,
Patuxent Institution, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965).
27. See, e.g., Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 888
(1949); Ortega v. Ragen, supra note 8.
28. Dayton v. McGrenery, supra note 9.
29. United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
30. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Brabson v. Wilkins, 45
Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Supp. Ct. 1965), modified 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div.
1966).
31. See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
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inmate may not be prevented from petitioning the courts.2 Nor may
the prison officials frustrate the prisoner's efforts to communicate with
the courts by delaying such correspondence (e.g., beyond an appeal
deadline).- Communication with attorneys presents a more difficult
question, for officials have the problem of determining who is in fact
the prisoner's attorney, or if the prisoner is using an unscrupulous at-
torney as a channel of communication for illegal activities. Furthermore,
the addressee of such correspondence may be a fictitious person, or one
who is not an attorney at all. Nevertheless, it has been held that a pris-
.oner may not be prevented from corresponding with his attorney,34
:although at least one court has held that such mail may be examined by
authorities to determine whether it is genuine legal correspondence or
illegal or prohibited activity. 5
The activities of the so-called "jailhouse lawyer" " have also been
the subject of considerable litigation. Formerly, such unofficial legal
assistance was severely proscribed,37 but a 1966 case appears to mod-
erate this position to permit reasonable access of other prisoners to the
services of a legally talented inmate.S
Access to legal texts and materials has also been a thorny question.
The matter was once considered to be within the discretion of the prison
authorities,39 but it now appears that, while prisons are under no obli-
gation to provide special facilities or equipment for legal research,
40
prisoners must be given a reasonable opportunity to pursue their legal
32. See note 29, supra.
33. Fallen v. U.S., 378 U.S. 139 (1964). A contrary result was reached on a different
set of facts in Berman v. U.S., 378 U.S. 530 (1964).
34. See note 30, supra.
35. Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959). It is also interesting to note
that in many state prisons (although not in the Federal prison system), conversations
between prisoners and visiting attorneys are monitored. This practice was upheld in
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
36. This term is usually applied to a prisoner who assists other prisoners in preparing
petitions and other legal papers.
37. Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 856 (1958). See
also Hatfield v. Bailleaux, supra note 8.
38. Johnson v. Avery, 252 F.Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), wherein the court ob-
served that "[tihe present regulation [restraining the activities of 'jailhouse lawyers']
. . . has the practical effect of silencing forever any constitutional claims which
many prisoners might have." Id. at 785.
39. Wilson v. Dixon, supra note 37; Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, supra note
8; Grove v. Smyth, 169 F.Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1958).
40. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, note 29, supra,
[Vol. 9:178
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efforts.41 Restrictions which effectively prohibit a prisoner from gain-
ing access to the courts have been judicially disapproved. 42
Habeas Corpus. This problem of prisoner access to the courts hag
given rise to a new judicial view of the function of the writ of habeas
corpus. Such a proceeding was formerly regarded as appropriate only
when the goal was the prisoner's immediate release from prison. The
writ was considered to be a means of testing the legitimacy of the im-
prisonment itself, not the means or manner of it.43 In addition, the writ
was supposedly available only as a last resort, when all administrative
remedies had been exhaused.44
These barriers to the use of habeas corpus as a means of resolving in-
ternal prison problems first began to fall more than two decades agoY.4 As
early as 1944, a writ was granted where the remedy sought was not total
release, but transfer to another institution.46 The court stated that "the
fact that a person is legally in prison does not prevent the use of habeas
corpus to protect his other inherent rights." 47 Since that time, a num-
ber of decisions have made it clear that the writ is no longer limited to
the testing of the legality of the incarceration. 8 When a court has
adopted this viewpoint, the exhaustion of remedies rule is easily satisfied
or circumvented.49
41. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, supra note 8. See also Federal Bureau of Prisons policy
statement on access to legal materials, January 21, 1966.
42. See Judge Solomon's opinion in Bailleaux v. Holmes, supra note 35. This case
was reversed in Hatfield v. Bailleaux, supra note 8, upon a different evaluation of the
factual situation, and an intervening liberalization of prison policies.
43. "Habeas corpus may not be used to secure judicial decision of any question which,
even if determined in the prisoner's favor, could not result in his immediate release.
The only relief authorized is the discharge of the prisoner, and that only if his detention
is found to be unlawful. . . ." United States ex rel. Binion v. United States Marshal,
188 F. Supp. 905, 908 (D. Nev. 1960); aff'd, 292 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1961). The leading
case on this point is McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934). See also Williams v. Steele,
194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952); Benjamin v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1949); Snow
v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788 (1944).
44. Johnson v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864 (1949) (per curiam).
45. In effect, the decline of the hands-off doctrine began in this area of the law.
46. Coffin v. Reichard, note 17 supra.
47. Id. at 445.
48. Johnson v. Avery, supra note 38; Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); United States
ex rel. Westbrook v. Randolph, 259 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1958); Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S.
206 (1951); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361
P.2d 417 (1961) (dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961); In re Chessman, 44 Cal.2d
1,279 P.2d 24 (1955).
49. The Federal habeas corpus statute (28 U.S.C. H§ 2241-54 (1964)) provides that
the exhaustion of remedies rule does not apply where such remedies are unavailable or
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Punishment. The task of keeping several thousand unruly convicts in
a state of relative obedience to authority requires that a system of re-
wards and punishments be available to the prison administration.
Almost every correctional institution includes a special confine-
ment unit for those who misbehave seriously after they are in-
carcerated. This "prison within a prison" usually is a place of soli-
tary confinement, sometimes without bedding or toilet facilities,
accompanied by reduced diet and limited access to reading ma-
terials or other diversions, and occasionally without any kind of
light. Lesser penalties, such as extra work or denial of cigarettes,
desserts, movies, or other small pleasures, are imposed for less se-
rious infractions. In addition, many adult correctional systems auto-
matically provide time off a sentence (good time) for each month
of good behavior in the institution, and deny or withdraw this
time if the inmates seriously misbehave. These, together with ad-
verse parole recommendations, are the main traditional disciplinary
tools in institutions.50
Such disciplinary measures were once regarded as judicially un-
touchable.5 1 Now, however, the slow demise of the hands-off doctrine
has produced a number of prisoner suits protesting the application of
these sanctions.5 2
The use of solitary confinement (also called "maximum security" or
"The Hole") has been the most frequent source of litigation, and such
confinement has been ruled improper under the circumstances in several
cases. The use of "strip cells" (bare cells without conveniences of any
kind) resulted in an injunction against prison officials53 and the issuance
of regulations prohibiting the use of such cells in the state prison
system.54 In Fidwood v. Clemmer,55 a Black Muslim prisoner was con-
where circumstances have rendered the available remedies ineffective or inadequate to
protect the rights of the prisoner.
50. TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRUEcrONS, supra note 4, at 50.
51. Williams v. Steele, supra note 43; Snow v. Roche, supra note 43; State v. Doo-
little, 122 Conn. Supp. 32, 158 A.2d 858 (Super. Ct. 1960).
52. These suits have most frequently been based upon the language of the Eighth
Amendment, which states that
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
53. Jordan v. Fitzharris, No. 44786, D. Calif, denied Sept. 6, 1966.
54. Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights
of the Convicted, 45 Nm. L. REv. 669, 686 (1966).
55. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 30.
[Vol. 9:178
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fined in maximum security for making inflammatory racist statements. °
Despite the threat which this prisoner represented to prison order and
discipline, the court regarded the confinement as excessive punishment
which fell within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,5 7 and ordered
the prisoner returned to the general prison population. s Similarly, in
Howard v. Smyth, 59 confinement of a Black Muslim prisoner to maxi-
mum security for an extended period was found to be excessive, and
release to the general prison body was ordered. 0 Release was also
ordered for a prisoner confined to maximum security in Johnson v.
Avery.01
Transfer within the prison, between prisons, or from one type of
institution to another is now regarded as subject to judicial review.,2
Courts have also intervened in cases where prisoners were disciplined
for filing lawsuits against prison officers, 3 and for making false allega-
tions in a petition.34
Judicial review of the discipline of prisoners is one of the most sig-
nificant areas in which the hands-off doctrine has been rejected, be-
cause of the potential problems which such intervention creates for
prison officials. 65
Religious Freedom. The most prolific source of prisoner litigation has
been the effort of members of the Black Muslim sect to secure what
they consider to be their religious rights. Muslim prisoners have de-
manded that they be provided with a place to hold their assemblies, 0
that speakers be allowed to deliver messages of racial hatred at such
56. The court found the statements to be "offensive, insulting, and disturbing to
white inmates and to non-Muslim negroes and to engender those feelings which tend
to menace order." ld. at 378.
57. See note 52, supra.
58. "A punishment out of proportion to the violation may bring it within the
bar against unreasonable punishments." Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 30, at 379.
See also Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 668 (1962).
59. 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1967).
60. In Howard v. Smyth, the decision was grounded upon considerations of freedom
of religion, rather than a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See text accompanying
notes 79-81 infra.
61. Supra, note 38.
62. See, e.g., People ex reL Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 174 N.E.2d 725, 215
N.Y.S.2d 44 (1961).
63. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F.Supp. 818 (N.D. IlM. 1964).
64. In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 (1962).
65. See text accompanying notes 85-86, infra.
66. See In re Ferguson, supra note 48; Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
19671
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meetings,6 7 that Muslims be allowed free communication with sect
leaders outside the prison,68 that they be provided with a special diet or
special dining hours required by their religion,6" and that they be per-
mitted to disobey white guards because of the Muslim belief in the
superiority of the Negro race."" In one prison, Muslim inmates organized
and operated their own system of "kangaroo courts" within the walls,"
and at the Federal prison at Leavenworth, Black Muslims assembled in
the prison yard to undergo training by Muslim instructors in judo and
karate, while other inmates were kept out of the area by Muslim
"sentries." 72
All of these demands and activities have been justified as exercises of
the religious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment.73 A number
of courts have expressly recognized the Muslims as a religious sect,74
and, while sometimes decided on other grounds (e.g., the Eighth
Amendment), these cases have unfortunately presented the appearance
of a direct conflict between the currently fashionable First Amend-
ment and the practical requirements of prison security and discipline.
In a few cases, the courts have found the requirements of prison opera-
tion to be reasonable, and have upheld the decisions of the prison au-
thorities. In one case, prohibition of Muslim assemblies in the prison was
upheld. In another instance, the Court approved two administrative
actions76 but disapproved three others. 77 There have been a number of
other cases in which Muslim demands were rejected. 8
In a disturbing number of decisions, however, the judgment of the
67. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra note 30; In re Ferguson, supra note 48.
68. Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 NE.2d 791, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962).
69. Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964).
70. In re Ferguson, supra note 48.
71. Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
72. Jones v. Willingham, 248 F.Supp. 791 (D. Kans. 1965). For judicial comment on
the violent and disruptive nature of the Black Muslim movement, see Sostre v. McGinnis,
supra note 71.
73. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit
the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
74. Fulwood v. Clemmer, upra note 30; Banks v. Havener, 234 F.Supp. 27 (E.D. Va.
1964); Bryant v. Wilkins, 265 N.Y.S.2d 995 (App. Div. 1965).
75. In re Ferguson, supra note 48.
76. Prisoner disciplined for inflammatory racial statements; officials refused to permit
prisoner to correspond with leaders of Black Muslim sect. Fulwood v. Clemmer, supra
note 30.
77. Penalty imposed was too severe; chapel facilities were denied to Muslims; officials
confiscated Muslim religious medals. Id.
78. See note 82 infra.
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prison staff has been judicially disapproved, and relief granted to the
prisoner. In Howard v. Smytb, 9 a Muslim prisoner sought release from
maximum security confinement. The prison officials maintained that
this confinement was not punishment, but merely segregation of the
prisoner from the general inmate population in the interest of prison
security.8 0 The court bypassed the security question and ordered
Howard released from maximum security, disapproving the "arbitrary
imposition of such serious disciplinary action where the assertedly of-
fensive conduct bears so close a relationship to First -Amendment free-
doms." 81
Other courts have granted relief on similar grounds."2
Summary. At present, therefore, it appears that a majority of courts
are prepared to undertake judicial review of virtually every phase of
prison administration. In an increasing percentage of the cases, the ad-
ministrative decisions of the prison officials are being judicially reversed,
and the rights of the prisoners are being constantly expanded.
EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The severe difficulties which face the prison administrator in the
accomplishment of his complex task of confinement and rehabilitation
can only be further complicated by the new judicial interest in prisoner
complaints. The eventual consequences to the effectiveness of the prison
system are as yet largely a matter of speculation. Serious apprehensions
have been expressed, and certain effects are already visible.
A commonly voiced fear is that the continuing concession of new
rights to prisoners, coupled with the extension of the use of habeas
corpus, will result in pandemonium not only in the prison itself but
throughout the entire legal system. A flood of frivolous or spurious
claims unleashed by an energetic inmate population could seriously clog
an already overburdened court system, placing great strain on the time
79. Supra note 59.
80. Howard, a Black Muslim prisoner, met with prison staff members to demand
that Muslim inmates be permitted to hold services in the prison. Howard refused to
divulge the names of the prisoners whom he represented in making the demand. He was
thereafter confined to maximum security. The prison officials stated that the existence
of a cohesive group of unidentified prisoners within the prison represented a threat to
security, and that Howard's confinement was made necessary by this consideration.
81. Howard v. Smyth, supra note 59 at 431.
82. For a detailed discussion of litigation by Black Muslims, see Note, Suits by Black
Muslim Prisoners to Enforce Religious Rights, 20 RIrrGERs L. REv. 528 (1966).
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and resources of correctional personnel, attorneys, and judges." To
some extent, at least, this fear is already becoming a reality. In 1941, 134
Federal writs of habeas corpus were filed by state prisoners; in fiscal
1963, 1,692 petitions were filed; in fiscal 1964, 3,248 were filed; and in
fiscal 1965, 4,845 were filed. More than 95 per cent of these applica-
tions were held to be without merit."
Perhaps even more serious is the potential effect of this trend on the
ability of prison staffs to maintain order in the prisons. Many prisoners
will undoubtedly become more interested in producing petitions and
engaging in litigation than in participating in rehabilitation programs and
vocational training. Other inmates, knowing that the prison officials are
hampered by judicial restrictions on their disciplinary powers, will take
advantage of the situation by engaging in hitherto illegal or proscribed
activities within the prison. If the elaborate security rules made necess-
sary by the near-impossible task of keeping several thousand ingenious
felons where they do not wish to remain8 5 are made subject to con-
stant modification or abrogation by the courts, the ability of prison
officials to prevent such activities will be seriously impaired."6 A pro-
gressive decay of authority, with a corresponding increase in assaults,
escapes, and riots, is greatly feared.87
In particular, administrators fear the effects of the concessions made
to the Black Muslim groups, whose cohesiveness, militancy, and power
have been the subject of comment not only by prison officials but by
the courts as well.88
83. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS, at 84 (1967).
84. Defender Newsletter, Vol. III, No. 6, at 16 (1966).
85. For a description of the constant duel of wits carried on between the prison staff
and enterprising inmates, see SYKEs, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIvES (1958).
86. For example, separation from the general prison population may be the only means
by which the prison staff can prevent a violent or militant prisoner from causing serious
disturbance in the prison community. When such isolation is characterized as "punish-
ment" and countermanded by the courts, with the result that the agitator is returned
to the general prison population, an undesirable and perhaps dangerous situation has
been created.
87. ". . . [ilf prisoners are allowed access to the courts to test the wisdom of the
decisions of administrative personnel, this will undermine that authority by constantly
subjecting these decisions to judicial reexamination." Brief for the Appellee, pp. 5-6,
Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962).
".... if the decisions affecting these most fundamental aspects of prison responsibility
are subject to judicial review, then it is obvious that the result will be inimical to
effective discipline and thus to the maintenance of security." Brief for the Appellee,
pp. 3-4, Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962).
88. Jones v. Willingham, supra note 72.
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Lastly, it is foreseen that the imposition of rigid, unrealistic require-
ments upon the prison system by courts inadequately informed as to the
harsh realities of the penal society will discourage experimentation and
innovation by penologists seeking to fulfill the higher objectives of the
system.89
Those who approve of the recent decisions point out that these
predicted disasters are by no means inevitable. Despite the increase in
prisoner petitions, it is believed probable by many observers that the
courts for the most part will act with reason and restraint, granting peti-
tions on an individual basis rather than making sweeping rulings which
would destroy the power of prison administrators to govern their own
institutions. ° That the courts are not unaware of the problems of prison
management has been demonstrated in cases such as Nelson v. United
States,"' in which it was held that the fact that the prisoner was being
held illegally was no defense for his defiance and misconduct while in
prison.
It is also likely that the increased judicial pressure on prison ad-
ministrators will lead to the establishment of more effective administra-
tive channels for review of prisoner complaints, and more active ad-
ministrative supervision of the policies and decisions of prison staffs. Such
administrative mechanisms have until now been ineffective or lacking in
many jurisdictions. Their creation would undoubtedly reduce the neces-
sity for judicial supervision and reduce the intensity of whatever super-
vision remains. 2
It has been further argued that the awareness by the prisoners that
they have not been totally abandoned to the arbitrary will of all-power-
ful jailers may have a beneficial effect in the rehabilitation process. It
is said that the convict, by seeking his goals through legal, socially ap-
proved channels, instead of criminal activity, will undergo a revealing
new experience which will contribute greatly to his rehabilitation as a
law-abiding, productive member of society.9 3 The validity of this last
proposition will be difficult to evaluate, to say the least.
89. TASK FORCE REPoRT: CORRECONS, supra note 83, at 83.
90. See Fuwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962), where a test of reason-
ableness was applied with the result that the judgment of the prison officials was upheld
in some respects and rejected in others.
91. 208 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1953).
92. See the case of Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), in which the
court based its evaluation (and rejection) of the actions of Virginia State Penitentiary
officials upon standards set forth in the Manual of Correctional Standards (1964), a pub-
lication of the American Correctional Association.
93. For a detailed treatment of these arguments, see generally Comment, Beyond the
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of the accuracy of these various predictions, it is apparent
that the entrance of the courts into the world of prison and prisoner is
now an established fact. While it must not be supposed that all courts
have concurred in this trend,94 many have and most eventually will.
Although it is generally agreed that some deprivation of individual
rights is inevitable as long as the prison system exists, the gradual shift in
emphasis from punishment to rehabilitation has brought with it the con-
viction that the felon is still a human being, albeit a rather poor specimen
of the breed, and that he retains at least the basic rights enjoyed by all
Americans. The temper of the times is definitely that "the rights of the
best of men are secure only as the rights of the vilest and most abhor-
rent are protected," " and certainly few if any would argue with this
statement as a matter of principle.
But, as always, the danger lies in the application of worthy ideals to
the exigencies of everyday life. It is doubtful that the goals of modern
penology will be served in a prison where the administration is hand-
cuffed by judicial controls, and the prisoners (armed with habeas
corpus, mandamus, the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act,
and the First and Eighth Amendments) run the institution. In a coun-
try where the skyrocketing crime rate has become a national issue and
law enforcement is having its own problems with judicially imposed
restrictions, a breakdown of the prison system hardly seems desirable.
It is therefore to be hoped that penologists will prove flexible enough
to adapt to the new requirements, and that jurists will continue to oper-
ate under the rule of reason and to exercise caution in their pronounce-
ments.
It is already clear that the resolution of this problem short of chaos
will require the utmost wisdom, perception, and restraint.
Charles E. Friend
Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Con-
victs, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963).
94. See, e.g., Cannon v. Willingham, 358 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1966).
95. People v. Gitlow, 234 N.Y. 132, 158, 136 N.E. 317, 327 (1922) (dissenting opinion
of Pound, J., in which Cardozo, J., concurred).
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